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Nudges with paternalistic aims pose special legal problems in liberal States. Surprisingly,
the discussion on regulation-by-nudging has not focused on the constitutional limits to
nudging. Although the property rights of firms potentially infringed by nudging measures
are dealt with in the literature and by (international) courts (e.g. the tobacco cases), the
potential infringement of the rights of those being nudged is neglected. But judges may at
one point be confronted with a nudge regulation challenged by the individuals being
nudged; and even before reaching a court, the legality of nudging should be scrutinised by
legislators.
I explore the legal limits of paternalistic nudging under the German Constitution, especially
the right to freedom of action and self-determination under Art. 2 (1) German Basic Law,
judging different types of nudges by the proportionality principle. At issue is the question of
how much paternalistic nudging and what types of paternalistic nudges the fundamental
rights protection in Germany permits. The analysis can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to
non-paternalistic nudges (targeting externalities and public goods/bads).
1. The Tool Box of Paternalistic Measures
The legal system has different instruments at its disposal to regulate with a paternalistic
intention: (1) it can manipulate choice invisibly (choice manipulation), including invisible
default rules, (2) it can command or prohibit certain choices explicitly (prohibitions), or (3) it
can support choice (choice support). Supportive instruments can take the form of either a
measure providing facilitation for an isolated decision by an individual, or a communicative
process. An isolated choice facilitation instrument is limited to slowing down the decision
of an isolated individual during the decision-making process. It is a stop sign aiming at
inducing auto-deliberation. From an autonomy point of view, enabling learning is crucial.
These instruments supporting choice can be put in place by different measures, e.g.
information, self-engagement help (as with casinos), (open) default rules and regret
mechanisms. An initial approach is to give individuals full, accessible information.
However, individuals usually communicate before they take important decisions – and
arguably only the latter should be the target of regulation in liberal States. To the best of my
knowledge, communicative choice facilitation instruments have been largely ignored by
legal scholars and behavioural economists addressing paternalism. A communication-
oriented regulation of biases establishes rules in support of rationality and autonomy, and
improves the basis for individual choice through communication and deliberation. This kind
of regulation provides especially strong stop signs, capable of influencing preferences and
cognition while guaranteeing autonomy, e.g. patient commissions in hospitals.
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2. A Proportionality Assessment
The German constitutional scope of rights protection, is, in contrast to European protection
of human rights, without any gaps – any state measure can be assessed under Art. 2 (1)
GG (right to freedom of action and self-determination). This right has a very broad scope of
protection and is subsidiary to other, more specific rights. It includes the right to use the
freedom in a way which contradicts (in the eyes of third persons) the well-understood
interests of the individual, including the “freedom to illness”.[2] Any nudging measure thus
falls under the scope of protection of the right. Nudging regulation can be counted as an
interference with the right, since a broad concept of ‘interference’, which may even include
indirect, non-targeted effects on an individual’s sphere of liberty emanating from
governmental action is used; a fortiori targeted, even if invisible nudges must count as an
interference.
Can paternalistic nudges be constitutionally justified? The proportionality assessment
consists of a four-pronged test (for laws which are necessary in my view as a basis for
paternalistic nudging measures): legitimate aim of the measure, suitability of the measure
and least restrictive means tests and proportionality strictu sensu. Paternalism targeting
preferences (autonomy) needs to be subjected to greater scrutiny than paternalism
targeting cognition (rationality). If, taking Mill´s bridge example, the wanderer wants to
cross the decrepit bridge after being informed (correcting cognition) about the danger, that
preference needs to be respected.
The first test is the legitimate aim of a nudge. Liberal paternalism remains unclear whether
it´s goal is some kind of “objective” welfare (e.g. a healthy body), full rationality or
autonomy. In liberal societies, I submit, the goal of a nudge must be the enablement of
autonomy or rationality, it cannot be an “objective” idea of welfare of individuals. Other
voices even deny this, holding that any sort of paternalism is unjustified.[3] The GFCC has
been firm in protecting freedom of will against commonly assumed preferences and
rationality.[4] Thus, nudges targeting only the welfare of individuals without due account of
their autonomy are problematic under German doctrine. The purported aim of a measure
was not always well scrutinized by the GFCC and it accepted third party effects (e.g. the
protection of the community of the insured), choosing a slippery slope.
Invisible and thus manipulating nudges may be suitable if welfare is the goal but they are
not fostering autonomy or rationality and even inhibit learning processes. Arguably,
invisible nudges, including invisible default rules are thus unsuitable in contrast to choice
supporting nudges. The regulation has to choose the least intrusive means – measured in
terms of autonomy. This implies that open information, educational campaigns etc. always
trump hidden nudging or manipulation. Isolated choice support is less intrusive than
communicative choice support which in turn is less intrusive than a prohibition which in
turn is less intrusive than invisible manipulation.
This article draws on other articles of mine: 'Begrenzte Rationalität und Paternalismusgefahr.
Das Prinzip des schonendsten Paternalismus' in M Anderheiden et al (eds), Paternalismus
und Recht (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2006), ibid 'Das deliberative Element juristischer
Verfahren als Instrument zur Überwindung nachteiliger Verhaltensanomalien. Ein Plädoyer
für die Einbeziehung diskursiver Elemente in die Verhaltensökonomik des Rechts' in C Engel
2/3
et al. (eds), Recht und Verhalten Beiträge zu Behavioral Law and Economics (Tübingen,
Siebeck/Mohr, 2007), ibid. 'Judge the Nudge: In Search of the Legal Limits of Paternalistic
Nudging in the EU' in A Alemanno and AL Sibony (eds), Nudging and the Law. What Can EU
Law Learn from Behavioural Sciences? (Oxford, Hart, forthcoming 2014).
[2] GFCC Decision of October, 7 1981, 2 BvR 1194/80, para. 45.
[3] C Hillgruber, Der Schutz des Menschen vor sich selbst  (1992); K Möller, Paternalismus
und Persönlichkeitsrecht (2005); K Fischer, Die Zulässigkeit aufgedrängten staatlichen
Schutzes vor Selbstschädigung (1997).
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‚Vernunfthoheit‘ staatlicher Organe über den Grundrechtsträger dergestalt, dass dessen
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Präferenzen abweicht oder aus der Außensicht unvernünftig erscheint“.
LICENSED UNDER CC BY NC ND
SUGGESTED CITATION  van Aaken, Anne: Constitutional Limits to Paternalistic Nudging in
Germany, VerfBlog, 2015/1/07, https://verfassungsblog.de/constitutional-limits-
paternalistic-nudging-germany/.
3/3
